Robert Putnam and the Two-Level Game: An Analysis of Mexico's Foreign Policy During the Diplomatic Crisis with Cuba in 2004
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59673/amag.v2i2.88Keywords:
Putnam, Double level game, winsets, foreign policy, Mexico, CubaAbstract
Robert D. Putnam is one of the main references in the studies of international negotiations. This article explores the application of Robert Putnam’s Double-Level Game theory to the 2004 diplomatic crisis between Mexico and Cuba, shedding light on the intricacies of decision-making in foreign policy. Putnam’s theoretical framework, incorporating the concept of winsets, proves instrumental in deciphering the nuanced interactions between international and domestic factors influencing the actions considered by President Vicente Fox and his advisors. The analysis emphasizes the practical applicability of Putnam’s theory, given the negotiation boards with the United States and Cuba, as well as the internal polarization between conservative and nationalist groups. Researchers and scholars interested in Mexico’s foreign affairs will find this theoretical framework valuable for comprehensive analyses of diplomatic decision-making processes.